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Education investment effects of affi rmative
action policy. Contest game argument.
Andrzej Kwiatkowski
Economic Studies, University of Dundee∗
Abstract
In this paper we investigate the problem of effort effects of the affi rmative
action policy. We develop a version of a rent-seeking game in the style of Tullock
(1980) with two heterogeneous players and two stages, considering that ahead
of the formal competition players can invest to lower their effort cost. Using
this model we show that there are instances in which the normative objective of
affi rmative action policy to make a level-playing field may be missed. Namely, we
demonstrate that if in relative terms the cost of acquiring skills for the ex ante
weaker player (a member of a discriminated group) is low enough as compared to
the ex ante stronger player (non-discriminated), then in the actual competition
the ex ante weaker player may become stronger than the ex ante stronger player.
This result shows that AA programmes cannot be effective if they are designed
in isolation based on the minority-group membership only and without taking
into account the actual costs of acquiring skills (that is education or learning) by
individuals.
Keywords: Asymmetric contest; afirmative action; discrimination; education;
JEL classification: C72; D63; I38; J78
1 Introduction
Affi rmative action (called also positive discrimination) is a public policy instrument
whose objective is to ameliorate the adverse effects of discrimination on affected groups
of individuals. One of the potential consequences of affi rmative action programs is with
respect to effort incentives, affecting the effort levels of both —the discriminated and
non-discriminated individual. The problem of effort provision under equal treatment
and affi rmative action policy in competitive settings, such as in sports, workplaces,
university/school admissions, etc., is addressed by many authors (see for instance Fu
(2006); Schotter and Weigelt (1992), Fain (2009), Franke (2012), Nti (2004) and Runkel
∗Correspondence: Economic Studies, University of Dundee, 3 Perth Road, Dundee DD1 4HN, UK;
Tel: (+44) (0) 1382 384372; Fax: (+44) (0) 1382 384691; Email: a.kwiatkowski@dundee.ac.uk.
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(2006)) and their research provides certain guidance on the effort effects of those policy
instruments. A common feature of those studies is that all the effort investment is made
in the competition stage only. In reality however, such contests are often preceded by
investments of the players into their ability to fight in the competition. In this paper
we study the problem of effects of the affi rmative action policy, considering that ahead
of the formal competition players can invest to lower their effort cost.
There is a handful of theoretical economic studies on contest-like situations that
incorporate the idea of costly investment made by players to improve competency prior
to the formal competition (see for instance Münster (2007) or Fu and Lu (2009)). They
consider games with two stages where players expend two separate types of effort: the
effort in the first stage to improve their skills to fight in the competition and the effort
in the second stage in the actual competition. Formally, players’skills to fight in the
competition are reflected by their marginal cost of effort, and any investment in the
effort in the first stage reduces its level. In this paper we build on this idea. We assume
that prior to the competition players may make an effort investment, costly in terms of
their utility, to reduce their marginal cost of effort in the fight in that competition. We
will call this type of effort "learning effort", to distinguish it from the from the type
of effort individuals exert exclusively in the competition stage - "competitive effort"1.
This distinction between the two types of effort may be very important if we consider
the effects of affi rmative action programmes, as learning effort may respond to various
incentives in a way different than competitive effort2.
We develop a simple model which is a version of a rent-seeking game in the style of
Tullock (1980) with two heterogeneous players and two stages. Ex ante, players differ
in their levels of marginal cost of (competitive) effort. The player with a higher level
of that marginal cost ex ante is considered to be discriminated and the other one -
non-discriminated. Prior to the actual competition there is a learning stage in which
players can invest some (learning) effort to lower their own levels of marginal cost of
(competitive) effort. Exerting learning effort, however, is costly in terms of utility, and
1The distinction between different types of effort investmenst is motivated not only by the obser-
vation that in real life settings learning process is separated in time from actual competition. What
also makes learning distinct from actual competing is the fact that learning investment may require
some other skills and have other nature than actual competing and is also usually more spread in
time. Learning is often a repetitive task or process, whereas actual competing can be viewed as a kind
of one-off task. Moreover, "learning effort" can be interpreted in much broader sense as any costly
investements improving the skills level (or human capital) of individuals. In this way, purchases of any
essential equipment required to learn or study or any other capital investemnt in human capital can
be viewed as a form of "learning effort", as defined in our model.
2As a result of that potentially it may happen that an ex ante weaker (less skilled, discriminated)
agent becomes the stronger one (more skilled) in the actual competition. This means that the objective
of the affi rmative action policy to ameliorate the adverse effects of discrimination and creating a level
playing field for all agents is totally missed. That is in the actual competition the discriminated agent
is more skilled than the non-discriminated one and in addition benefits from the affi rmative action
policy support.
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the players differ in their marginal cost of learning effort3. In the model we consider two
policy options: equal treatment policy and affi rmative action policy. The affi rmative
action policy can vary in its intensity and the equal treatment option is defined as
a special case of the affi rmative action policy option when its intensity is zero. The
policy(ies) are defined formally as restrictions on the contest rule which, depending on
the implemented policy, imply different effort incentives for the individuals. With this
formulation, the key question that we study is how individuals react to the changes in
incentives that are induced by the policies as regards their learning and competitive
effort.
Using our model we demonstrate that allowing the players to invest in their learning
effort has a strong effect on their levels of the marginal cost of the competitive effort in
the actual competition, and that in equilibrium the exact levels of that marginal cost
are influenced by the intensity level of the implemented AA policy. Over the wealth of
the parameter space, for each agent the relation between the learning effort level and
the intensity of the AA policy follows an inverted-U-shaped curve, with one distinct
maximum in the intensity level. Interestingly, we observe that for some combinations
of the model parameters the objective of the AA policy to create a level playing field, is
totally missed: in equilibrium in the final stage of the game the ex ante weaker (discrim-
inated) player actually becomes stronger than the ex ante stronger (non-discriminated)
one. This happens when in the relative terms the cost of learning for the discrimi-
nated player is low enough as compared to the cost of learning of the non-discriminated
player. This result shows that AA programmes implemented in the formal competi-
tion cannot be effective if they are designed in isolation based on the minority-group
membership only and without taking into account the actual costs of acquiring skills
(that is education or learning) by individuals. Using our model we also investigate the
problem of the optimality of the contest from the point of view of the contest holder
utilizing as the standard of comparison of various policies the total level of the learning
effort and the total level of the competitive effort. We show that for both standard of
comparison there exist an optimal level of the intensity level of the implemented AA
policy, including the ET policy, that induces that highest level of effort In general this
maximum requires some degree of the intensity of the AA policy. However, there are
also cases when the maximum occurs for when the ET policy is implemented.
Our work is related to some other models in the economic theory literature. In
particular it is related to numerous papers that study the effects of affi rmative ac-
tion policy in various competitive settings. In this strand of research, Franke (2012)
investigates the problem of effort provision under equal treatment and affi rmative ac-
tion policy. Fryer and Loury (2005) consider a simple model of pair-wise tournament
competition to investigate group-sighted and group-blind forms of affi rmative action
3In this dimension, our model is a form of generalization of Münster (2007) and Fu and Lu (2009)
mentioned earlier, who assumed that the marginal cost of learnig effort of individuals is the same. By
assuming heterogeneity in this respect we are able to investigate the role played by differences in the
cost of aquiring skills as regards the levels of both types of effort and how they interplay with the effort
incentives of affi rmative action policy.
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in winner-take-all-markets. Fain (2009) and Schotterand and Weigelt (1992) using the
tournament-game framework study whether affi rmative action programs and equal op-
portunity laws affect the output of economic agents. Fu (2006) addresses the problem
of affi rmative action policy in admissions to a college using a two-player all-pay auction
model. Our work is related to numerous works on contest games in various settings4.
In this strand of the literature the closest to our study are Münster (2007) and Fu and
Lu (2009) who consider the contests in which players prior to the formal competition
make costly investment to improve their skills, and Nti (2004) and Runkel (2006), who
investigate the problem of maximum level of total effort in contests.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we introduce our model. In Section
3 we compute the model equilibrium and perform the analysis of learning effort and
the parameters of marginal cost of competitive effort. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
Typical settings where affi rmative action instruments are employed cover various situ-
ations of competitive social interaction. The competitive structure of these situations
can be conveniently captured using a contest game model. In this game contestants
compete for an indivisible prize by exerting (competitive) effort, and by exerting more
effort the contestants can increase their respective probability of winning the prize.
This feature of the game reflects the basic structure of many situations of competitive
social interaction. Another property reflected by a contest game model is that con-
testants face a probabilistic outcome, being the consequence of a relatively high grade
of discretion on the side of the competition organizer. A distinguishing feature of our
model relative to those already existing in the literature lies in the assumption on the
existence of two types of effort: competitive and learning, exerted exclusively in two
different stages of the game. Competitive effort is exerted in the competitive stage
when the actual fight for the prize takes place, whereas learning effort is exerted in the
learning stage before the fight. The purpose of exerting learning effort is to lower the
marginal cost of competitive effort.
To guarantee analytical tractability and closed form solutions, our model is for-
mulated under complete information, i.e. the only element of uncertainty is the final
winner of the contest. In the paper we will use the standard notion of Subgame Perfect
Equilibrium (SPE).
2.1 Primitives
Let N = {1, 2} denote the set of risk-neutral individuals who compete against each
other in a contest game. Agent 1 is assumed to be a member of a non-discriminated
group (we will call them a non-discriminated player), and agent 2 —a member of a
discriminated group (a discriminated player). The contest is organized in the following
way: It consists of two stages S = {0, 1}. In stage 1 the agents compete against each
4For a more detailed review of the literature in this area of research see Nitzan (1994) or Dechenaux,
Kovenock and Sheremeta (2014).
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other and the winner gets the prize. To win the contest, each contestant i ∈ N exerts
a competitive effort level ei ∈ R+, while their opponent —a contestant j ∈ N, i 6= j
—exerts a competitive effort level ej ∈ R+. It is assumed that both contestants have
the same positive valuation V for the contested prize. The contestants differ in the
respective "cost function" that captures the disutility of exerting competitive effort ei.
It is assumed that for all i ∈ N this cost function is linear in ei and multiplicative in
β1i, such that:
ci (ei) = β1iei, (1)
where β1i > 0 is the parameter of marginal cost of competitive effort of an agent i in
stage 1. By assumption, marginal cost of competitive effort is finite and constant. In
stage 0 the agents may decide to invest some effort into learning. At the beginning of
the game an agent i has initial marginal cost of competitive effort ex ante, β0i > 0. By
investment in learning in stage 0 an agent i may reduce the level of that marginal cost.
Formally, given a learning effort level εi ∈ R+ and the marginal cost of competitive
effort ex ante, β0i, the marginal cost of competitive effort of an agent i becomes




Exerting learning effort is costly in terms of utility. The contestants differ in the cost
function that captures the disutility of exerting learning effort εi. It is assumed that
for all i ∈ N this cost function is linear in εi and multiplicative in γi, such that:
ci (εi) = γiεi, (3)
where γi > 0 is the parameter of marginal cost of
6 learning effort of an agent i in stage
0. By assumption, marginal cost of the learning effort is finite and constant.
We assume also that the contestants are heterogenous in terms of their parameter
of marginal cost of competitive effort ex ante β0i and are ordered, such that β01 < β02,
with normalization β01 = 1. We denote β02 = β.
The contestants perceive the outcome of the contest stage of the game as proba-
bilistic. However, they can influence the probability of winning by exerting competitive
effort, which means that the outcome depends on the vector of the effort levels ex-
erted by both individuals. In our model we will employ the following Contest Success
Function (CSF) pi : R2+ → [0, 1]:
pi(ei, ej) =
αPi ei
αPi ei + α
P
j ej
, for all i ∈ N, (4)
with αPi > 0 for all i ∈ N . This function maps the vector of effort levels (ei, ej) into win
probabilities for each contestant. This is a restricted version of a CSF axiomatized in
6As noted ealier, in this dimension, our model is a form of generalization of Münster (2007) and Fu
and Lu (2009), who assumed that the marginal cost of learnig effort of individuals is the same.
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Clark and Riis (1998)7. This function possesses a very convenient feature that allows an
asymmetric treatment of the contestants that can be interpreted as affi rmative action
policy. This is done by appropriate setting values of positive weights αPi , that depend
on the policy P . If no contestant exerts positive effort, it is assumed that none of the
individuals receives the prize, i.e. pi(0, 0) = 0 for all i ∈ N 8.
A contestant i ∈ N aims to maximize his expected utility, which, given the cost
functions (1) and (3) and the contest mechanism (4), takes the following (additive
separable) form:
ui (ei, ej, εi) = pi(ei, ej)V − βi1 (εi) ei − γiεi. (5)
We assume that in both stages while making their effort decision the agents behave
in a non-cooperative way. The implemented policy option P is announced to both
contestants before the whole game starts in stage 0.
2.2 The Policy Options
In this section we describe the set of policy options P which later will be compared
in terms of learning effort levels that they generate. Agent 1 is a member of a non-
discriminated group and agent 2 — of a discriminated group. With respect to this
discrimination, we consider two policy options: equal treatment policy (ET ) and af-
firmative action policy (AA). Equal treatment policy requires that both players are
treated in the same way, independently of whether they are members of a discriminated
or non-discriminated group. In turn, under affi rmative action policy the discriminated
group member obtains some advantage with respect to the non-discriminated group
member.
Formally, in our model the two policy options are reflected by setting appropriately
the individual competitive effort weights (αPi , α
P
j ) in the CSF defined in (4). Under
equal treatment policy (ET ) both players are treated by the contest rule (4) in the
same symmetric way. That is, if both players exert their competitive effort at the same
level, then each of them has winning probability of one half. This implies that policy
weights must be equal for all players, that is
αETi = α
ET for all i ∈ N.
Given that the CSF is homogenous of degree zero, without loss of generality these











, for all i ∈ N , with r > 0.
The parameter r measures the sensitivity of the outcome of the contest game with respect to differences
in effort. The assumption about r is needed because for a non-linear CSF with a general parameter
r > 0 it is not possible to derive closed form solutions. As the existence of closed form solutions is
crucial for the comparative analysis of the policy alternatives, it is assumed that the CSF is linear
with r = 1. Also with a general parameter r > 0 the existence of pure strategy equilibria cannot be
guaranteed (see Baye, Kovenock and de Vries (1994) for details). With the restriction r = 1 all our
equilibria are in pure strategies.
8Another convention in the contest-game literature is that pi(0, 0) = 12 for all i ∈ N . The choice of
either definition is not important in terms of our results.
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weights can be normalized such that
αETi = 1 for all i ∈ N.
In turn, under affi rmative action policy the discriminated group member is favoured
by the contest rule (4), which increases their winning probability compared to the non-
discriminated group member. That is, if both players exert the same level of the
competitive effort, then the discriminated group player wins with probability higher
than one half, and the non-discriminated group member with probability less than one
half. Therefore the AA policy generates a bias of the CSF in favor of the discriminated




Given that the CSF is homogenous of degree zero, without loss of generality these
weights can be normalized such that
αAA1 = 1 < α
AA
2 .
The equilibrium effort levels of each contestant will depend on the ex ante announced
policy parameter P . The main focus of our analysis will be the effects of the policy
options on the levels of learning effort and the resulting marginal cost of competitive
effort β1i.











α = 1, ifP = ET,
α > 1, ifP = AA.
Note that the definition of the policy parameter α allows us to study the effects of im-
plementation of various instances of affi rmative action policy, differing in their intensity.
It is also worth noting that with this formulation of the CSF and the policy options
equal treatment policy (ET ) can be interpreted as a particular case of affi rmative action
policy (AA) for when its intensity is zero.
3 Analysis
3.1 Stage 1
We start by solving our model by backward induction for competitive effort levels of
players in stage 1. In this stage agents 1 and 2 compete against each other by exerting
competitive effort. Plugging the CSF and the cost function as specified in eq. (6)
7
and (1) into the expected utility function of an agent i in eq. (5) and differentiating,
produces the following first order conditions:{
αe2
(e1+αe2)
2V − β11 = 0, for agent 1,
αe1
(e1+αe2)
2V − β12 = 0, for agent 2,









Those competitive effort level candidates are strictly positive, given our assumptions











which proves concavity. Thus the maxima exists and are interior and unique.
So it follows from our analysis, that there exists a unique interior (sub)equilibrium,











Plugging this result into eq. (5) (together with the CSF and the cost function as














In stage 0 each agent chooses their level of learning effort. That effort allows the
individuals to modify their respective parameters of marginal cost of competitive effort





2, ε1) given in eq. (8) with respect to their non-negative learning effort level
ε1, given a non-negative learning effort level of agent 2, ε2. In a similar way, agent
2 maximizes their expected payoff u2 (e∗1, e
∗
2, , ε2) with respect to their non-negative
learning effort level ε2, given a non-negative learning effort level of agent 1, ε1.
After plugging the relation between a learning effort level εi and the marginal cost of
competitive effort ex ante β0i as specified in eq. (2) into the expected payoff functions



















3V − γ2 = 0, for agent 2.
(9)
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Considering the non-negativity constraints those formulas produce the following best
reply functions:






















To find equilibrium for learning effort we study four cases:
Case 1:B1 (ε2) > 0 and B2 (ε1) > 0,
Case 2:B1 (ε2) > 0 and B2 (ε1) = 0,
Case 3:B1 (ε2) = 0 and B2 (ε1) > 0,
Case 4:B1 (ε2) = 0 and B2 (ε1) = 0.
Case1: B1 (ε2) > 0 and B2 (ε1) > 0 Solving the system of equations formed by




















Case 2: B1 (ε2) > 0 and B2 (ε1) = 0 Setting ε2 = B2 (ε1) = 0 in B1 (ε2) in the














































Case 3: B1 (ε2) = 0 and B2 (ε1) > 0 Setting ε1 = B1 (ε2) = 0 in B2 (ε1) in the
















































Case 4: B1 (ε2) = 0 and B2 (ε1) = 0 In this case both equilibrium effort level
candidates are zero. This happens whenever none of the previous conditions for positive
effort levels holds.



























which proves concavity. Thus the maxima exist and are unique.
So it follows from our analysis, that there exists a unique (sub)equilibrium, in which




























 , if C3,






































































Plugging this result into eq. (2) and considering that β01 = 1 and β02 = β, produces
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 , if C3,
(1, β) , otherwise.
(12)
Conditions C1 - C3 define the sets of parameters’values for when the learning effort
levels of players are positive. It is worth discussing here the role played by the value
of the contest prize V in determining whether those are both, just one, or none of the
players who exert their learning effort at a positive level. When the prize value is very





2 ) and the





2 ), then both players improve their marginal cost
of competitive effort by exerting learning effort at a positive level. However, when V
is at a moderate level, then either agent 1 or agent 2 stops investing in their learning.
Whether this is specifically agent 1 or agent 2, it depends first of all on whether the
first part or the second part of condition C1 still holds. If the first part of C1 holds,









2 ), then agent 1 may be
active in exerting their learning effort (subject to some extra conditions) and agent 2










2 ), then agent 1 is not active in exerting their learning
effort and agent 2 may be active (again subject to some extra conditions). It’s worth
noting here that when the prize value V is very low, then none of conditions C1 - C3
is satisfied and none of the players invests in their learning effort.
Careful investigation of conditions C1 - C3 reveals that whether this is the first part





. The first ratio is the relative marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1 with respect
to agent 2, the second one measures in relative terms the size of the discrimination level
of agent 2 as reflected by β, with respect to the extent of the affi rmative action policy,
α. For the first part of C1 to hold and not the second one, that is for agent 1 being






This condition will hold whenever the intensity of the affi rmative action policy is rela-
tively low as compared to the level of discrimination of agent 2 ex ante β and/or when
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the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2 γ2 is relatively high as compared to the
marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1 γ1, that when is learning is costly in relative
terms for the discriminated player. In turn, for the first part of C1 not to hold and the







which will hold when the intensity of the affi rmative action policy is relatively high as
compared to the level of discrimination of agent 2 ex ante β and/or when the marginal
cost of learning effort of agent 2 γ2 is relatively low as compared to the marginal cost
of learning effort of agent 1, γ1, that is when learning is cheap in relative terms for the
discriminated player.
So putting aside all the additional conditions in C2 and C3 required for one agent
only to be active in exerting learning effort, it can be noted that a crucial role in
determining whether this is either agent 1 or 2 who is active is played by the intensity
of the affi rmative action policy and/or how costly it is for the discriminated player to
invest in learning effort. Cheap learning for agent 2 and/or a high intensity of the AA
policy makes it more likely for the discriminated player to invest. These incentives
disappear if learning is costly and/or if there is low intensity of the AA policy.
The additional conditions in C2 for active agent 1 when agent 2 is inactive require
that either the intensity of affi rmative action policy is high enough (higher in value than
the marginal cost of competitive effort ex ante of agent 2, β) together with relatively
low level of the prize value V , or alternatively that the prize value V is relatively high
within its range of the admissible values. In turn, the extra conditions in C3 for active
agent 2 together with inactive agent 1 require that either the intensity of affi rmative
action policy is low enough (lower than the marginal cost of competitive effort ex ante
of agent 2, β) together with relatively low level of the prize value V , or alternatively
that the the prize value V is relatively high within the range of its admissible values.
3.3 Marginal Cost of Effort Levels Under Equal Treatment
Policy
It is interesting to notice, that even if the AA policy is not implemented (and the ET
option is in place then), the agents may have incentives to invest in their learning effort
and improve their original levels of marginal cost of competitive effort ex ante, β0i.
Setting α = 1 in eq. (12).and we obtain that under the equal treatment policy the
12
























 , if C3,
(1, β) , otherwise.
(13)
As we see, for all active agents they are different from their original levels of 1 and β,
respectively for agent 1 and 2. As changing the levels of marginal cost of competitive
effort requires learning effort, this shows that even if there is no AA in place, some
investment in learning effort may occur.
3.4 Effects of Affi rmative Action on Marginal Cost of Com-
petitive Effort and Learning Effort Levels
Agents’investment in learning effort in stage 0 of the game affects the marginal cost
of competitive effort in stage 1. In this part of our analysis we discuss the effects
of implementation the various policy options on the learning effort levels of players
and the resulting levels of marginal cost of competitive effort. We will consider the
agents’behavior under affi rmative action policy of various intensities (α > 1) and equal
treatment policy (α = 1). In the following the equal treatment policy option is treated
as a special case of the affi rmative action policy option when its intensity is zero.
3.4.1 Agent 1
Agent 1 is the non-discriminated player (β0i = 1) and although they are not the object
of the AA policy, their marginal cost of competitive effort is affected. The following
proposition characterizes how the AA policy of various intensity levels (including the
ET policy as its special case) affects the equilibrium level of the marginal cost of
competitive effort of that player.
Proposition 1 The equilibrium level of the marginal cost of competitive effort of agent
1, β11 is
(a) when both agents are active (C1 holds):






- decreasing in α, if
























- increasing in α, if
α > 1,
- has a minimum in α, if
α = 1,






- increasing in α, if
α ≥ 1,
b) when agent 1 only is active (C2 holds)
(b.i) for when V < γ1
β2
holds:
- decreasing in α, if
α ≥ 1,
(b.ii) for when V = γ1
β2
holds:
- decreasing in α, if
α > 1,
(b.iii) for when γ1
β2
< V < 27γ1
β2
holds:






- increasing in α, if





(b.iv) for when V = 27γ1
β2
holds:






- increasing in α, if





- has a minimum in α, if
α = 1,




- decreasing in α, if























Proof. For part a) of the Proposition 1 (when C1 holds and both agents are active),
using the corresponding equilibrium marginal effort levels of agent 1 in (12) and differ-













































∩ α > 1
)
,


















∩ α = 1
)
.
This can be rewritten as in the Proposition, proving its part a).
For part b) of the Proposition (when C2 holds and agent 1 only is active), using the
corresponding equilibrium marginal effort levels of agent 1 in (12) and differentiating














which is negative if (
V < γ1
β2

































(V = 27γ1β2 ∩ α > 1) ∪ ( γ1β2 < V < 27γ1β2 ∩ α ≥ 1)∪(
V > 27γ1
β2





and equal to zero, if(
V > 27γ1
β2









∩ α = 1
)
.
This can be rewritten as in the Proposition, proving its part b).
It follows from this Proposition 1 that the marginal cost of competitive effort of
agent 1, β11 changes as the intensity of the AA policy varies. For when both agents,










holds, that is when the level of discrimination of agent 2 ex ante β is
high and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1, γ1 is relatively low as
compared to the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2, γ2 (learning is cheap for





reaches its minimum and then it starts to increase. By eq. (2), this means that initially,
as the response to the increase in the intensity of the affi rmative action policy, agent 1
invests more and more in learning effort to improve their marginal cost of competitive




. After that point the






holds, that is when the level of discrimination of agent 2 ex ante β is
low and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1, γ1 is relatively high
as compared to the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2, γ2 (learning is costly
for agent 1 in relative terms), then β11 is always increasing. This means that, as the
response to the increase of the intensity of the affi rmative action policy, agent 1 invests
less and less in learning to improve their marginal cost of competitive effort.
A more complicated picture emerges when agent 1 is the only active agent and
condition C2 holds. In this case, the behavior of β11 as a function of α is dependent on




and is additionally affected by the existence of the




9. It is worth noting here that within the space defined




doesn’t belong to the set defined by C2 and lies in between
the parameter space areas defined by
(















the learning effort level of agent 1 is zero. This
means that their level of marginal cost of competitive effort β11 is constant in this range of α and
always equal to its level ex ante of 1.
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β11 is always decreasing in α. If V <
γ1
β2
holds, that is when the level of discrimination
of agent 2 ex ante β is low and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1,




, and by the previous
observation β11 is always decreasing in α for all α ≥ 1. This means that in this case
the increase in the intensity of the affi rmative action policy always results in agent 1
investing more and more in learning to improve their marginal cost of competitive effort.
If V = γ1
β2
, then there is the discontinuity point is at α = 1, and β11 is always decreasing
in α, for all α > 1. In turn, if γ1
β2
< V < 27γ1
β2
holds, then β11 is initially increasing up to









means that in this case, as the response to the increase in the intensity of the affi rmative
action policy, for small intensity levels of the AA policy, agent 1 invests less and less in
their learning effort to improve marginal cost of competitive effort and later when the
AA intensity level crosses the neighborhood of the discontinuity point, this investment
starts to go up. Finally, if V ≥ 27γ1
β2
, that is when the level of discrimination of agent
2 ex ante β is high and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1, γ1 is














11. This means that initially for small intensity levels of the AA
policy, as the response to the increase in the intensity of the affi rmative action policy,
agent 1 invests more and more effort in their learning to improve their marginal cost





that point the incentives to invest further in education are reduced and the investment
starts to drop. However, this happens only up to the neighborhood of the discontinuity
point, and when the AA intensity level crosses this point, this investment starts to go
up again.
As there is inverse relation between the marginal cost of competitive effort in stage
1 and the level of learning effort exerted as given in eq. (2), using Proposition 1 we can
easily determine the level of the intensity of the AA policy, including the ET option,
that induces for agent 1 the highest level of the learning effort. The following Conclusion
summarizes the results regarding this problem:
Conclusion 1 The equilibrium level of the learning effort of agent 1, ε∗1, is maximized
in α
10As we noted earlier, in the neighbourhood of the discontinuity point the level of marginal cost of
competitive effort β11 is constant in α and equal to its level ex ante of 1.
11As earlier, in the neighbourhood of the discontinuity point β11 is constant in α and equal to 1.
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a) when both agents are active (C1 holds):















b) when agent 1 only is active (C2 holds):
globally at α→∞, if V ≤ γ1
β2{
locally at α = 1,
globally at α→∞, if
γ1
β2
< V < 27γ1
β2{






if V ≥ 27γ1
β2
.
Proof. To prove the Conclusion we will use the fact that there is inverse relation
between the marginal cost of competitive effort in stage 1 and the level of learning
effort exerted as given in eq. (2).
For part a) of the Conclusion, when both agents are active (C1 holds): using the
results summarized in Proposition 1 we obtain that the marginal cost of the competitive
effort of player 1 is minimized in α















By eq. (2), the same conditions define where the level of the learning effort of player 1
is at maximum, proving part a) of the Conclusion.
For part b) of the Conclusion, when agent 1 only is active (C2 holds): using the
results summarized in Proposition 1 and the fact that limit of the marginal cost of
competitive effort of player 1 when α→∞ is zero, we obtain that the marginal cost of
the competitive effort of player 1 is minimized in α:
globally at α→∞, if V ≤ γ1
β2{
locally at α = 1,
globally at α→∞, if
γ1
β2
< V < 27γ1
β2{






if V ≥ 27γ1
β2
.
By eq. (2), the same conditions define where the level of the learning effort of player
1 is at maximum. As player 1 is the only one who exerts effort in this case, the same
conditions define where the maximum of the total level of equilibrium learning effort
is, which proves part b) of the Conclusion.
It is interesting to consider Conclusion 1 in terms of the policy options that induce
the highest level of learning effort of agent 1. If both agents are active players, then
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there is a well defined global maximum of the learning effort level, that depends on









holds (the level of discrimination of agent
2 ex ante β is high and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1, γ1 is
relatively low as compared to the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2, γ2), then
the maximum learning effort level is exerted when the implemented policy is AA and its









holds (the level of discrimination
of agent 2 ex ante β is low and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1,
γ1 is relatively high as compared to the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2, γ2),
then the policy that induces the highest level of learning effort for agent 1 is the ET
option.
When agent 1 only is active, the situation is much more complex. Depending on
the specific combination of the model parameters, there can be either a (proper) local
maximum with no (proper) global maximum(a), or no (proper) global maximum at
all. For V ≤ γ1
β2
, there is neither (proper) global maximum nor local maximum, and
the higher the intensity of the AA policy, the higher the learning effort level of player
1. If V > γ1
β2
, then again there is no (proper) global maximum, but there is a local
maximum. Again, (globally) the higher the intensity of the AA policy, the higher the
learning effort level of player 1. Additionally however, there is a local maximum at
α = 1 for γ1
β2
< V < 27γ1
β2




for V ≥ 27γ1
β2
. This means that in the former
case locally the ET option induces the highest learning effort level, and in the latter
(again locally) the highest learning effort level is exerted when the implemented policy






Agent 2 is the discriminated player (β0i = β) and they are the object of the AA policy.
The following proposition characterizes how the AA policy of various intensity levels
(including the ET policy as its special case) affects the equilibrium level of the marginal
cost of competitive effort of this player:
Proposition 2 The equilibrium level of the marginal cost of competitive effort of agent
2, β12, is:
a) when both agents are active (C1 holds):
(a.i) for when γ1
γ2
< 2β2 holds:
- decreasing in α, if


















(a.ii) for when γ1
γ2
= 2β2 holds:
- increasing in α, if
α > 1,
- has a minimum in α, if
α = 1,
(a.iii) for when γ1
γ2
> 2β2 holds:
- increasing in α, if
α ≥ 1,
b) when agent 2 only is active (C3 holds)
(b.i) for when V < β2γ2 holds:









- increasing in α, if(















(b.ii) for when V = β2γ2 holds:
- decreasing in α, if
















(b.iii) for when β2γ2 < V < 27β
2γ2 holds:
- decreasing in α, if


















(b.iv) for when V = 27β2γ2 holds:
- increasing in α, if
α > 1,
- has a minimum in α, if
α = 1,
(b.v) for when V > 27β2γ2 holds:
- increasing in α, if
α ≥ 1.
Proof. For part a) of the Proposition 2 (when C1 holds and both agents are active),
using the corresponding equilibrium marginal effort levels of agent 2 in (12) and differ-







which is negative if
γ1
γ2























= 2β2 ∩ α > 1
)
,
and equal to zero, if(
γ1
γ2









= 2β2 ∩ α = 1
)
.
This can be rewritten as in the Proposition, proving its part a).
For part b) of the Proposition (when C3 holds and agent 2 only is active), using the
corresponding equilibrium marginal effort levels of agent 2 in (12) and differentiating


























V = β2γ2 ∩ α > 1
)
∪(
β2γ2 <V < 27β
2γ2 ∩ α ≥ 1
) ) ,
positive if (





















and equal to zero, if(







V = 27β2γ2 ∩ α = 1
)
.
This can be rewritten as in the Proposition, proving its part b).
It follows from this Proposition 2 that the marginal cost of competitive effort of
agent 2, β12 changes as the intensity of the AA policy varies. For when both agents,






≤ 2β2 holds, that is when the level of discrimination of agent 2 ex ante β is
high and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2, γ2 is relatively high
as compared to the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1, γ1 (learning is costly for





reaches its minimum and then it starts to increase. This means that initially, as the
response to the increase in the intensity of the affi rmative action policy, agent 2 invests
more and more effort in their learning to improve their marginal cost of competitive




. After that point the
incentives to invest further in learning effort become lower and the investment drops.
In turn, if γ1
γ2
> 2β2 holds, that is when the level of discrimination of agent 2 ex ante β
is low and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2, γ2 is relatively low
as compared to the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1, γ2 (learning is cheap
for agent 2 in relative terms), then β12 is always increasing. This means that, as the
response to the increase in the intensity of the affi rmative action policy, agent 2 invests
less and less in their learning effort.
The relation between the AA intensity level α and the the marginal cost of com-
petitive effort of agent 2 β12 is more complex when agent 2 is the only active agent.
Then, the behavior of β12 as a function of α is dependent not only on the relation
between V , β2γ2 and 27β
2γ2 but is also affected by the existence of the discontinuity




12. It is important to note here that within the space defined by




, then independently of the relation between V , β2γ2 and 27β
2γ, β12
is always decreasing in α. If V ≤ β2γ2 holds, that is when the level of discrimination of
agent 2 ex ante β is high and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2, γ2
is high (learning is costly for agent 2), then β12 is initially increasing up to the disconti-








13 until the minimum
12This discontinuity point at α = β
√
γ2
V doesn’t belong to the set defined by C3 and lies in between
the parameter space areas defined by
(











tion reveals that in the neighbourhood of α = β
√
γ2
V the learning effort level of agent 2 is zero. This
means that their level of marginal cost of competitive effort β12 is constant in this range of α and
always equal to its level ex ante of β.






is reached. After that point, β12 starts to increase again. This means that
in this case, as the response to the increase in the intensity of the affi rmative action
policy, for its small intensity levels, agent 2 invests less and less in their learning effort
and later when the AA intensity level crosses the neighborhood of the discontinuity





After that point the incentives to invest in education are lower and the learning effort
investment levels become smaller and smaller, as α increases. If β2γ2 < V ≤ 27β2γ2,
then the evolution of β12 is very similar to the one for V ≤ β2γ2, except for the fact
that in this case there is no discontinuity point in α. That is β12 is first decreasing and




. This means that initially, as the
response to the increase in the intensity of the affi rmative action policy, agent 2 invests
more and more in their learning effort to improve their marginal cost of competitive




. After that point the
incentives to invest in learning effort are reduced and the investment starts to drop. In
turn, if V > 27β2γ2 holds, that is when the level of discrimination of agent 2 ex ante β
is low and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2, γ2 is low (learning
is cheap for agent 2), then β12 is always increasing. This means that, as the response
to the increase in the intensity of the affi rmative action policy, agent 2 invests less and
less in their learning effort to improve their marginal cost of competitive effort.
As for agent 1, we study also the levels of the intensity of the AA policy, including
the ET option, that induces for agent 2 the highest level of the learning effort. Our
results regarding this problem are summarized in the following Conclusion:
Conclusion 2 The equilibrium level of the learning effort of agent 2, ε∗2, is maximized
in α
a) when both agents are active (C1 holds):







globally at α = 1, if γ1
γ2
> 2β2,
b) when agent 2 only is active (C3 holds):{





globally at α = 1
if V ≤ β2γ2,




, if β2γ2 < V ≤ 27β2γ2
globally at α = 1, if V > 27β2γ2.
Proof. As for Conclusion 1, to prove Conclusion 2 we will use the fact that there is
inverse relation between the marginal cost of competitive effort in stage 1 and the level
of learning effort exerted as given in eq. (2).
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For part a) of the Conclusion, when both agents are active (C1 holds): using the
results summarized in Proposition 2 we obtain that the marginal cost of the competitive
effort of player 2 is minimized in α







globally at α = 1, if γ1
γ2
> 2β2,
By eq. (2), the same conditions define where the level of the learning effort of player 2
is at maximum, proving part a) of the Conclusion.
For part a) of the Conclusion, when agent 2 only is active (C3 holds), we use the
results summarized in Proposition 2 and the relation between the value of the marginal












. Using some algebra within the domain of the admissible
values of the model parameters it can be shown that







, if V ≤ β2γ2,







, if β2γ2 < V < 27β
2γ2,







, if V = 27β2γ2.
Using this result and Proposition 2 we obtain that the marginal cost of the competitive
effort of player 2 is minimized in α{





globally at α = 1
if V ≤ β2γ2,




, ifβ2γ2 < V ≤ 27β2γ2,
globally at α = 1, if V > 27β2γ2.
By eq. (2), the same conditions define where the level of the learning effort of player
2 is at maximum. As player 2 is the only one who exerts effort in this case, the same
conditions define where the maximum of the total level of equilibrium learning effort
is, which proves part b) of the Conclusion.
We can interpret the results in Conclusion 2 in terms of the policy options inducing
the highest level of learning effort of agent 2. If both agents are active players, the
there is a well defined global maximum of the learning effort level, that depends on the
relation between γ1
γ2
and 2β2. If γ1
γ2
≤ 2β2 holds (the level of discrimination of agent
2 ex ante β is high and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1, γ1
is relatively low as compared to the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2, γ2),
then the maximum leaning effort level is exerted when the implemented policy is AA




. In turn, if γ1
γ2
> 2β2 holds (the level of
discrimination of agent 2 ex ante β is low and/or when the marginal cost of learning
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effort of agent 1, γ1 is relatively high as compared to the marginal cost of learning effort
of agent 2, γ2), then the policy that induces the highest level of learning effort for agent
2 is the ET option.
When agent 2 only is active, then depending on the specific combinations of the
model parameters, there is either one (proper) global maximum, or both a (proper)
global maximum and a (proper) local maximum. For V > β2γ2 there is a global




for β2γ2 < V ≤ 27β2γ2, and at
α = 1 for V > 27β2γ2. This means that in the latter case this is the ET option that
induces the highest learning effort level of player 2, and in the former this is the AA




. If V ≤ β2γ2, then there is both a
(proper) global maximum and a (proper) local maximum. Again, there is a maximum




, but now it is local only. Apart from that there is a global maximum at
α = 1. This means that in this case globally the ET option induces the highest learning
effort level of player 2.
3.4.3 Agent 1 vs Agent 2
As a result of exerting learning effort in stage 0 of the game, the values of the para-
meters of marginal cost of competitive effort are reduced. The size of this reduction
is different for different agents and depends on specific combinations of the values of
the model parameters (including the intensity of the AA policy, α). Given this, we
might expect that for some constellations of the model parameters, this reduction for
the discriminated player - agent 2 is much higher than for the non-discriminated player
- agent 1, potentially leading to a situation in which the ex ante weaker player actually
becomes the stronger one in the final stage of the game. In this section we investigate
this potential phenomenon and study the conditions for it to take place. Our results
regarding this issue are summarized in the following Proposition:
Proposition 3 In equilibrium, the level of the marginal cost of competitive effort of
agent 1 becomes higher than the level of the marginal cost of competitive effort of agent
2 (β∗11 > β
∗












for when agents 2 only is active (C3 holds).
Proof. To prove the first inequality in the Proposition (when C1 holds and both agents













which after some algebra within the domain of the admissible values of the model







which proves the first part of the Proposition.
To prove the second inequality in the Proposition (when C3 holds and agent 2 only







which again after some algebra within the domain of the admissible values of the model





which proves the second part of the Proposition.
This Proposition summarizes the effects of the implementation of the AA policy
option on the levels of the marginal cost of competitive effort of the players. It shows,
that if both agents are active or only agent 2 is active in the first stage of the game,
then the ex ante weaker player - agent 2 may become the stronger one in the final stage
of the game, meaning that in such a case the normative objective of the AA policy to
create a level playing field, is totally missed: in equilibrium in the final stage of the
game the ex ante weaker (discriminated) player becomes actually stronger than the ex
ante stronger (non-discriminated) one. If both agents are active, then what is required
for this to happen is the intensity of the affi rmative action policy α high enough and/or
the marginal cost of the learning effort of agent 2 γ2 relative to the marginal cost of
learning effort of agent 1, γ1 low enough and/or the marginal cost of competitive effort
ex ante of agent 2, β, low enough. A similar effect can be observed if only agent 2
is active in the first stage of the game. In this case agent 2 may become the stronger
player in the final stage of the game when the marginal cost of the learning effort of
agent 2 γ2 is low enough and/or the marginal cost of competitive effort ex ante of agent
2, β is low enough. However, the role played by the intensity of the AA policy α is
slightly more complex. α enters the condition (14) in a non-monotonic way: the RHS
of the condition is decreasing for α < 2, increasing for α > 2, with a minimum when
α = 2. Therefore the levels of α that are either very low - close to 1, or very high -
much above 2, make it less likely for agent 2 to become the stronger player in the final
stage of the game. The intuition behind this last result is that with low levels of the
intensity of the AA policy, the chances of agent 2 to win the contest are low anyway,
therefore it not beneficial for them to incur the extra cost of learning, that would not
improve their winning chances too much. In turn with high levels of the intensity of
the AA policy, it simply doesn’t make sense for agent 2 to invest in learning effort, as
the AA policy will improve their relative performance anyway without them incurring
any cost.
26
The results in Proposition 3 highlight the importance of the actual costs of acquiring
skills (that is of education or learning) by individuals and their role played in designing
effective AA programmes. They show that such programmes will not be effi cient if they
are designed in isolation based on the minority-group membership only and without
taking into account the actual costs of acquiring skills.
3.5 Optimality of the Affi rmative Action Policy
Contests may be used to meet different objectives. As contests create inherent incentives
for the players to exert high level of competitive effort, they could be designed so that
the level of the total competitive effort is maximized. In other settings the contest
organizer may want to maximize the total level of learning effort of players. In this
section we study the optimality of the AA policy of various intensity levels using as
standards of comparison the sums of learning effort levels and competitive effort levels
of players.
3.5.1 Maximization of Total Learning Effort
The equilibrium learning effort level of each contestant are dependent on the ex-ante
announced intensity of the AA policy given by parameter α and the standard of com-































− 1, if C3,
0, otherwise.
(15)
The following Proposition summarizes our results as regards the optimality of the AA
policy when the objective of the contest holder is to maximize the total level of learning
effort of players.
Proposition 4 The total level of equilibrium learning effort E∗L is maximized when the
following conditions hold:































b) when agent 1 only is active (C2 holds)
globally at α→∞, if V ≤ γ1
β2{
locally at α = 1,
globally at α→∞, if
γ1
β2
< V < 27γ1
β2{






if V ≥ 27γ1
β2
,
c) when agent 2 only is active (C3 holds){





globally at α = 1
if V ≤ β2γ2,




, if β2γ2 < V ≤ 27β2γ2
globally at α = 1, if V > 27β2γ2.
Proof. To prove part a) of the Proposition (when C1 holds and both agents are active):
using the corresponding equilibrium total learning effort level in (15) and differentiating
with respect to α yields
2αβ2V (2α2β2γ1γ2 (γ1 − γ2)+β4γ32−α4γ31)
(α2γ1+β2γ2)
4 ,
which is positive if


















































































This can be rewritten as in the Proposition, proving its part a).
Part b) and c) of the Proposition (when either C2 or C3 holds and one agent only is
active) follows directly the results for when only one of the players is active summarized
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in Conclusion 1 and 2, which define the intensity levels of the AA policy that induce
the highest levels of the learning effort of players. As now the total learning effort level
is equal to the effort level of the active agent, the same conditions define where the
maximum of the total level of equilibrium learning effort is, which proves part b) and
c) of the Proposition.
It follows from Proposition 4 that depending on the specific combination of the
model parameters, there can either one (proper) global maximum, or one local and
one global (proper) maximum(a), or no (proper) maximum at all. We have a clearly
defined global maximum and no local maxima when both agents are active. However,
this becomes more complicated when one agent only is active. As discussed earlier,
when the discriminated agent - agent 2 is active only, there is both a (proper) global
maximum, and a (proper) local maximum. The most complicated situation is when
agent 1 is active only. In this case, in general there is no (proper) global maximum,
and for some specific model parameters there may be some local maximum.
3.5.2 Maximization of Total Competitive Effort
In this section we focus on the optimality of the AA policy of various intensity levels
using as a standard of comparison the sum of competitive effort levels of players. To
allow analytical tractability, we will limit our considerations here only to the case when
both agents are active (C1 holds). The equilibrium competitive effort level of each
contestant is dependent on the intensity of the AA policy. Therefore the standard of




i (α) for α ≥ 1. Plugging
the equilibrium marginal effort levels of agents for when C1 holds and both of them are






The following Proposition summarizes the conditions for the optimal level of the in-
tensity of the AA policy with the objective to maximize the total level of competitive
effort:
Proposition 5 For when both agents are active (C1 holds), the total level of equilibrium
competitive effort E∗C is maximized when
α = R (α, 3) , for γ1
γ2
≤ β2,
α = 1 for γ1
γ2
> β2,
where R (α, 3) is the third root of polynomial R (α):
R (α) = −3β4γ2 − 4β2γ1γ2α + 4β2γ1γ2α2 + 3γ21α3.
Proof. Using the corresponding equilibrium total competitive effort level in eq. (16)
and differentiating with respect to α yields





which is positive if




α > R (α, 3) , for γ1
γ2
< β2,
α > 1 for γ1
γ2
= β2,
α ≥ 1 for γ1
γ2
> β2,
and equal to zero, if
α = R (α, 3) , for γ1
γ2
≤ β2,
where R (α, 3) is the third root of polynomial R (α)
R (α) = −3β4γ2 − 4β2γ1γ2α + 4β2γ1γ2α2 + 3γ21α3
This can be rewritten as in the Proposition, proving its part a).
It follows from Proposition 5 that when both agents are active, then there is a
clearly defined global maximum of the total level of competitive effort. This maximum
depends first of all on the relation between γ1
γ2
and β2. If γ1
γ2
≤ β2, that is when the
relative marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1 with respect to agent 2 is not higher
than the square of the size of the discrimination level of agent 2 ex ante (as reflected
by β)14, then there is a maximum of the total level of competitive effort given by
α = R (α, 3) > 1. This means that some degree of the intensity of the AA policy is
required to induce the highest level of the total competitive effort. In the other case,
that is when γ1
γ2
> β2,the maximum is at α = 1, that is when the ET policy option
is implemented. This means that implementation of the AA policy of any intensity
(α > 1) would actually be harmful to the level of the total competitive effort of the
players, by reducing it.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we study a version of the Tullock model with two heterogenous players, in
which one player is considered a discriminated one with a higher level of the marginal
cost of competitive effort ex ante. The players are allowed to manipulate their original
levels of marginal cost of competitive effort by investing in education. In this setup,
our main objective is to investigate how different intensities of the affi rmative action
policy affect players’incentives modify their marginal cost of the competitive effort by
investing in their learning effort.
We show that the value of the prize in the competition stage of the game plays
a crucial role in incentivising the players to invest in their own learning effort. To
guarantee that both of them will exert learning effort requires a high value of the prize.
With a moderate prize value only one agent may invests in education, and with a low
14That could be the case when the level of discrimination of agent 2 ex ante β is high and/or when
the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2, γ2 is relatively high as compared to the marginal cost
of learning effort of agent 1, γ1 (learning is costly for agent 2 in relative terms).
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value —none of them. Our analysis demonstrates also that whenever a player invests
in learning effort, the precise level of that investment, and the resulting level of the
marginal cost of competitive effort varies as the intensity of the AA policy changes.
Over the wealth of the parameter space, the relation between the learning effort
level and the intensity of the AA policy follows for both agents an inverted-U-shaped
curve, with one distinct maximum in the intensity level, and those maxima are different
for different players. This is precisely the case when both agents, 1 and 2, are active
in the game. Additionally, what is interesting here, that in some cases those maxima
may occur for when the intensity of the AA policy is zero, meaning that actually the
ET policy is implemented. The exact combination of the model parameters when this
happens is different for different players, but in general it is required that the level of
discrimination of agent 2 ex ante is low and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort
of agent 1 is relatively high as compared to the marginal cost of learning effort of agent
2.
When there is only one agent that is active, the relation between the learning effort
level and the intensity of the AA policy becomes more complicated. When the active
agent is agent 1, then there is no (proper) global maximum of the learning effort, and
any proper maxima, if they exist, are local only. When agent 2 only is active, then
there is always one (proper) global maximum, or both a (proper) global maximum and
a (proper) local maximum. This global maximum may be when the intensity of the AA
policy is zero, meaning again that actually the ET policy is implemented.
As a result of exerting learning effort, the levels of the parameters of marginal cost
of competitive effort are reduced. We show that for some constellations of the model
parameters, this reduction for the discriminated player - agent 2 is much higher than
for the non-discriminated player - agent 1, which leads to a situation in which the ex
ante weaker player actually becomes the stronger one in the final stage of the game.
In such a case the objective of the AA policy is totally missed. If both agents are
active, then this situation happens when the intensity of the affi rmative action policy
is high enough and/or the marginal cost of the learning effort of agent 2 relative to the
marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1 is low enough, and/or the marginal cost of
competitive effort ex ante of agent 2 is low enough. A similar situation can occurs if
only agent 2 is active in the first stage of the game, and both - the marginal cost of the
learning effort of agent 2 and/or the marginal cost of competitive effort ex ante of agent
2 - are low enough. However, in this cases the role played by the intensity of the AA
policy is slightly more complex than previously and the intensity levels that are either
very low, or very high, make it less likely for agent 2 to become the stronger player in
the final stage of the game.
Using our model we also investigated the problem of the optimality of the contests
from the point of view of the contest holder. As the standard of comparison of various
policies we used the total level of the learning effort and the total level of the competitive
effort. In the former case, we showed that there is a clearly defined global maximum
and no local maxima when both agents are active. For small values of the level of the
marginal cost of competitive effort ex ante of agent 2 this maximum occurs when the
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ET policy is implemented. However, when the discriminated agent - agent 2 is active
only, there is both a (proper) global maximum, and a (proper) local maximum of the
total learning effort levels. When agent 1 is active only, in general there is no (proper)
global maximum. In the latter case (the standard of comparison is the total level of
the competitive effort), for when both agents are active there is a clearly defined global
maximum. The analysis shows that when the level of discrimination of agent 2 ex ante
is high and/or when the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 2 is relatively high as
compared to the marginal cost of learning effort of agent 1, then to induce the highest
level of the total competitive effort some degree of the intensity of the AA policy is
required. Otherwise, the maximum occurs for when the ET policy is implemented.
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